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THE NEW MILITIA TRADITION AND THE TRADITIONAL
AIR NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER

by

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Preface

“The New Militia Tradition and the Traditional Air National Guard Commander” carries the perspective of a traditional support commander, idiomatically known as a “citizen-soldier” or “weekend warrior.” In this work I discuss the evolving roles and missions performed by the reserve components with special emphasis placed on the Air National Guard. Raising the awareness level of the traditional Guardmember on some of the more significant issues created by changes in national security policy is the intention of this paper. As the defense budget shrinks along with the active duty force structure, the reserve components will undergo a major transformation. Seamless integration is more than a metaphor; it nearly a reality. The Air National Guard is no longer a junior partner to the Air Force. Military exercises and operations generally require Guard and Reserve participation. How all this impacts the traditional commander is a critical theme of this project.

My advisor, Colonel Craig Polley, deserves special recognition for the assistance and guidance he has provided over the past eight months. I appreciate his insight, patience, support, and, above all, his valuable time he generously gave. He is a true professional in every sense of the word. A personal thank you also goes to Colonel Gail Arnott for his inspiration as well as effort in making my experience at the Air War College a rewarding one.

Abstract

Democracy triumphed over communism in the Cold War. Now in the 1990's, America, true to her militia tradition, is de-mobilizing. Since 1989, the active-duty force has shrunk by one-third. Yet, 30,000 to 80,000 service members deploy weekly in support of approximately one half-dozen operations scattered around the globe. This smaller military repeatedly does more with less. What keeps the current operations tempo (optempo) from reaching a state of critical mass? The inclusion of the reserve forces in exercises and deployments. In particular, the Air National Guard has supported the active Air Force in every major deployment and operation since Desert Shield/Storm. The Total Force Policy goal of "seamless integration" is close to realization. But, what is the price? Reservists have also experienced the detrimental effects of optempo. Long tours of duty and short-notice deployments interrupt family life and cause disruptions in the civilian workplace. Can the traditional Air National Guard commander, a citizen-soldier, handle the increasing burdens and problems of leadership in a militia organization? Is the part-time commander relevant today as the identities of the Air Force regular and air reservist begin to blend? What does the 21st century hold for the air reserve components?

Chapter 1

The Evolution Of The Total Force

As we reduce the size of the active armed forces...,we are placing increasing reliance and dependence on the Guard and reserves as a combat-ready part of the total force structure...

—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 1972

Ironically, the Cold War offered military planners a degree of consistency and predictability no longer found in today's geopolitical environment. Knowing the adversary and the threat defined one's strategy, force structure and weapon systems. Today, new actors occupy the world stage. The rules governing the containment of Communism no longer apply. Instead of bipolar competition and confrontation, transnational themes now dominate the agenda of American policy makers—governmental corruption, illicit drug trade, environmental issues, population migrations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resource depletion, and terrorism.¹ For the United States military, this means an increasing number of new and non-traditional missions in regions throughout the world. Concomitantly, the active duty force is growing smaller because of budget cuts and downsizing. Since 1989, the active force has shrunk by one-third.² What keeps America's armed services from reaching a state of critical mass? Succinctly stated, the active force depends on the reserve components for critical skills and relief from an intense operational tempo.³

This chapter presents an overview of how the Total Force Policy has evolved from 1973 to the present. Key to this policy was building a team composed of active duty, reserve components and Department of Defense civilians. The reserve effort during Desert Shield/Storm and in Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Haiti has validated the underlying tenets of the Total Force Policy.

Adopted by the Department of Defense in 1973, the Total Force Policy called for modernizing the reserve components and integrating them with the active force.⁴ With Vietnam a public anathema, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird sought to address the problems of a dispirited military, declining defense budgets and the implementation of an all-volunteer force. He believed the Total Force concept could restore public confidence in the reserve forces while saving money through reductions in the size of the active military.⁵ The National Guard and Reserve suffered credibility problems during the 1960's because of controversy surrounding the inequities of the draft. These organizations "...acquired reputations as draft havens for relatively affluent young white men."⁶ Later, the media's lampooning of former Vice-President Dan Quayle for serving in the Indiana National Guard revealed the virulence of this perception. In the early 1970's, the reserve components trained to augment the active services for a global war against the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. With the passage of time, the active military came to rely on the reserves for operational support during peacetime as well as crisis.

Total Force Policy offered three attractive benefits—economy, experience and tradition.⁷ A modernized reserve force meant significant savings while adding to the overall readiness of the armed forces. "As part-timers, members of the Reserve provide the taxpayers with tremendous return on the investment, only costing anywhere from 25

percent to 75 percent of their active-duty counterparts.”⁸ The collective experience level contained in many reserve units often exceeded that of the regular services.

Guardsmen and reservists typically spend the majority of their military careers with the same organization. Experienced personnel give Air Force Reserve (AFRES) and Air National Guard (ANG) units a wealth of expertise from which to draw. Both the AFRES and ANG enlist a high proportion of individuals with prior military service. The ANG presently takes in 80 percent prior-service people versus 20 percent who have never served.⁹ Also, the average experience level for ANG pilots is eight to ten years greater than Air Force aviators.¹⁰ Because its 91 flying organizations and 1,550 support units are community based, the Air National Guard enjoys a direct link to the American public.¹¹

Historically, the America public identifies with national causes through its reserve force, particularly the Guard. The activation of reservists for World War I, World War II and Korea connected America with the armed forces who otherwise were a small core of professionals.¹² Vietnam taught us that the credibility of the military and the underpinnings of public support depended upon the willingness of the American people to commit their sons and daughters to combat. The concept of Total Force resurrected the Militia Tradition and the underlying values it manifested.¹³ The first litmus test of Total Force Policy occurred during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.¹⁴

Desert Shield/Storm was the first involuntary mobilization of reservists since the inception of the all-volunteer force and the Total Force Policy. Overall, 250,000 citizen-soldiers participated in the Persian Gulf War.¹⁵ One hundred and six thousand served in the Southwest Asian theater.¹⁶ Reserve forces mobilized and deployed without “unacceptable delay.”¹⁷ According to Terrence M. O’Connell, Chairman of the Reserve

Forces Policy Board, Desert Shield/Storm “...established the model for all future endeavors.”¹⁸ The active duty had the internal capacity to fight the Gulf War; but, lacked the logistical structure to sustain its combat forces.¹⁹ For the Air Force, its air reserve components possessed many of these capabilities such as air refueling and airlift. Appendix A delineates the current force composition of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

With robust Congressional funding of reserve programs through the years of the Reagan buildup, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard had achieved a high degree of integration with their parent service by 1990.²⁰ A 1992 report prepared by the National Defense Research Institute for the Office of the Secretary of Defense lauded the AFRES and ANG as being highly successful in mobilizing and performing missions during the Gulf War. Three reasons accounted for their success. First, the air reserve components met the same readiness standards expected from active duty units. Second, the Air Force provided the AFRES and ANG with funding, equipment and full-time personnel for quality training. Finally, the vast majority of air reserve officers and enlisted personnel had prior active duty experience. The end of conscription and the successful transition to an all-volunteer force attracted a different caliber of individual into the ranks of the AFRES and ANG. Over the course of almost 20 years, the ratio of prior-service to non-prior service shifted from 30/70 to 70/30.²¹ With the change of presidential administrations following the Election of 1992, the readiness and reliability of all the reserve forces came under critical review. The Bottom-Up Review saw the reserve components as a vital entity in America’s national security strategy for the Post-Cold War era.

The Bottom-Up Review represents a milestone in the evolution of the Total Force. Commissioned early in the Clinton Administration, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) took a comprehensive look at the challenges and threats facing the U. S. in the Post-Cold War world. The BUR also studied the size and shape of the armed forces America would need to advance and protect its national security interests. President Clinton, like his predecessor, continued downsize the active military and cut defense budgets. To prevent any degradation in effectiveness or readiness, the BUR proposed supplementing the active force missions with the reserves.

The Bottom-Up Review identified three missions for incorporating the reserves: fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs), provide strategic insurance against renewed global threats, and respond to domestic emergencies.²² To further enhance the effectiveness of the Total Force, the BUR advocated the concept of compensating leverage. Under this concept, the reserves would no longer be an augmentation force of last resort. Rather, they would participate in operations throughout the world performing day-to-day missions.²³ The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces reached similar conclusions.

The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act created the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) and authorized it to investigate ways to improve the effectiveness of military operations. Like the BUR, the CORM explored the future size and shape of the armed services. Also, the CORM approved of the three missions the Bottom-Up Review identified for the military. In evaluating America's future security needs, committee members believed that "...in the 21st century, every DOD element must focus on supporting the operations of the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs)."²⁴

The Commanders in Chief, under the authority and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, conduct military operations in assigned geographic regions of the world.²⁵ CINCs construct a unified force from a diverse array of capabilities supplied by other commands and services. The CORM proposed that the Department of Defense (DOD) “...continue its efforts to ensure that the reserve components contribute as much as practical to executing the national strategy. Significant savings and public goodwill can be generated by using reserve forces wherever and whenever they can provide a required military capability.”²⁶ Moreover, the CORM recommended assigning reserve components to a unified command during peacetime for joint training and greater integration. The CINCs would oversee the readiness and training of both active and reserve forces. Recent deployments to Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti and the involvement in military operations other than war (MOOTW) offer the reserve opportunities to exercise their skills while providing relief from optempo for the active force.²⁷

The Total Force Policy sought closer integration between the reserve components and the active duty force to deter war with the Soviet Union. Democracy triumphed in the Cold War; however, the world is still a dangerous place. Regional hot spots like Bosnia and Central Africa have superseded communism as a threat international order. Hence, the AFRES and ANG have participated in almost every contingency since the Gulf War.²⁸ In today’s global environment, the reserve components continue to adjust to new roles and missions along with their active duty brethren.

Notes

¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), i.

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² Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, "Building Foundation of America's Forces for 21st Century," *The Officer*, February 1997, 29.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Melvin R. Laird, "25th Anniversary of the Total Force," *The Officer*, November 1995, 20.

⁵ Charles J. Gross, *The Air National Guard and the American Military Tradition* (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 113.

⁶ Charles Gross, "The Air National Guard - Past, Present and Future Prospects," *Air Power Journal*, Winter 1996, 64.

⁷ Col Mark P. Meyer, *The National Guard Citizen-Soldier: The Linkage Between Responsible National Security Policy and the Will of the People* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1996), 20.

⁸ Deborah R. Lee, "Compensating Leverage for the 21st Century," *The Officer*, February 1997, 36.

⁹ Suzann Chapman, "Total Force Never Stops," *Air Force Magazine*, November 1996, 38.

¹⁰ Col Mark P. Meyer, *The National Guard Citizen-Soldier: The Linkage Between Responsible National Security Policy and the Will of the People* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1996), 20.

¹¹ Charles Gross, "The Air National Guard - Past, Present and Future Prospects," *Air Power Journal*, Winter 1996, 60.

¹² Lt Col James Lightfoot, *Mobilizing the Air National Guard for the Persian Gulf War*, Research Report no. AU-ARI-92-9 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 112.

¹³ Col Mark P. Meyer, *The National Guard Citizen-Soldier: The Linkage Between Responsible National Security Policy and the Will of the People* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1996), 21.

¹⁴ Richard Davis, *DOD Reserve Components-Issues pertaining to Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1996), 5.

¹⁵ William J. Perry, "Guard, Reserve in the Real World," *The Officer*, February 1995, 44.

¹⁶ Daniela Ashkenazy, ed., *The Military in the Service of Society and Democracy, The Challenge of the Dual Role Military* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 96.

¹⁷ National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 61

¹⁸ Terrence M. O'Connell, "America's Strength," *The Officer*, February 1996, 44.

¹⁹ Lt Col James Lightfoot, *Mobilizing the Air National Guard for the Persian Gulf War*, Research Report no. AU-ARI-92-9 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 115.

²⁰ Ibid., 110.

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²¹ National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 56-57.

²² Deborah R. Lee, "Compensating Leverage New Force Strategy," *The Officer*, February 1995, 29.

²³ Deborah R. Lee, "Compensating Leverage for the 21st Century," *The Officer*, February 1997, 36.

²⁴ Department of Defense, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services*, (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1995), ES-1.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 2-23.

²⁷ Terrence M. O'Connell, "America's Strength," *The Officer*, February 1996, 45.

²⁸ Richard Davis, "GAO Testimony: Reserve Issues Pertaining to Readiness," *The Officer*, May 1996, 21.

Chapter 2

Current Trends Affecting The Reserve Components

For the Reservists of the post-Cold War era, action has been translated into three Presidential Selected Reserve Call-ups (PRSCs)—Persian Gulf War, Haiti and Bosnia—and increasing involvement in worldwide exercises, humanitarian missions, peace-enforcement operations and real-world training here at home.

—Deborah R. Lee, February 1997
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

The inclusion of the reserve components in worldwide military operations since 1989 is a departure from the wartime scenario envisioned by the architects of Total Force Policy. Reservists regularly partake in a variety of missions—counterdrug, disaster relief, humanitarian, joint exercises, nation building, and peace enforcement to name a few.¹ A diminutive active-duty force can no longer handle its accelerating commitments unaided. Stress caused by frequent deployments and family separation has become a quality of life issue for the active services. A frustrating conundrum for active-duty commanders is how to assuage the effects of repeated operations or optempo without adversely affecting readiness. Making the reserve components a full-fledged partner in peace operations is one way of dealing with this problem. Table 1 illustrates the trend toward reserve involvement in overseas missions.

Table 1. Peace Operations Involving More Than 1,000 Volunteer Reservists 1992-96

OPERATION	MILITARY MISSION	EXAMPLES OF RESERVE SUPPORT
Deny Flight/Provide Promise (Bosnia)	Support U.N. No-Fly Zone; Provide Humanitarian Assistance	Airlift, Fighter Support, Air Refueling, Intelligence Support, Psychological Operations, and Logistics
Uphold Democracy (Haiti)	Secure Conditions for Return of Democracy	Airlift, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Military Police, Medical Support, and Construction
Provide Comfort (N. Iraq)	Provide Safe Havens for Population	Airlift, Fighter Support, and Psychological Operations
Provide Relief/Restore Hope/Continue Hope (Somalia)	Provide Security and Support for Relief Efforts	Airlift, Postal Support, Foreign Military Personnel Training, and Psychological Operations
Southern Watch (S. Iraq)	Monitor Repression of Population	Airlift, Fighter Support, Rescue, Psychological Operations, and Intelligence Support

Source: National Security and International Affairs Division, *Peace Operations: Reservists Have Volunteered When Needed* (Washington D. C.: General Accounting Office, 1996), 4-5

Eighteen thousand reservists from the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Naval Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve served voluntarily during these operations.²³ The AFRES and ANG comprised 80% of this group. Former Defense Secretary Perry cited the Air Force in 1996 "...as a model for the other services to follow in integrating their reserve components."²⁴ See Appendix B for the percentage of Air Force missions performed by AFRES and ANG forces between FY 1985 and FY 2001.

The Air Force has sustained personnel cuts of nearly one-third, while requirements have surged at a rate four times that of the Cold War period.⁵ The Air Force, with a current strength of approximately 400,000, is drawing down from 608,000 to 380,000 active personnel.⁶ To reduce the tempo of operations for active-duty units, the CINCs have incorporated the reserves into peacetime operations as advocated by the CORM. Suzann Chapman, Associate Editor for *Air Force Magazine*, states “Theater commanders have come to expect the same combat capability from Air Reserve Components that they received from USAF active-duty units.”⁷ Under former Secretary of Defense Perry’s increased-use initiative, the armed services and CINCs gain greater leverage from the reserves through additional annual training and real-world missions.

The increased-use initiative secures a broader role for the reserves through better coordination and planning. These approaches reduce active-duty optempo and complete more missions than normally possible given scant resources.⁸ Another program, Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) accomplishes readiness training within the United States. For example, during Arctic Care ‘96, joint medical IRT extended health services to Native American Eskimos in Northern Alaska.⁹ By building on dedicated tours of duty such as annual training, the CINCs and services can delegate or offer specific missions to reserve components.

Air Reserve Components conduct daily a variety of missions worldwide. Case in point. During July 1996, ANG deployments involved 8,000 personnel and 426 aircraft.¹⁰ On the other hand, short notice deployments can cause hardship for the reservist especially when civilian employers must hire temporary replacements, rearrange shift coverage or distribute the citizen-soldier’s work among other employees. Adequate lead-time helps


mitigate potential conflicts between military duty and civilian careers. As a result, the Air Force held its first deployment scheduling conference in 1995 with AFRES and ANG representatives. The Air Reserve Components presently receive six to nine months advance notice about upcoming deployments.

Deployments and overseas missions pose special dilemmas for reserve commanders. Involvement in longer, overseas deployments means extensive planning and preparation. Individuals and units, when activated, can expect a narrow window for mission preparation. “Clearly, this is placing a premium on readiness and training.”¹¹ Furthermore, military service today requires that attention be paid to a diverse range of concerns like personnel management, supply economy, professional relationships, and environmental issues.¹² Consequently, command increasingly demands more of a leader’s energy, talent and time. Part-time commanders may become hard-pressed to satisfy the demands of a civilian and a military career.

Part-time Guardmembers train one weekend per month and perform 15 days of active duty each year. When not in uniform, the majority of reservists work at civilian jobs. Major General Sheppard, Director of the Air National Guard, states, “Remember, our force is 75 percent ‘real’ people with ‘real’ jobs and 25 percent full-timers who are mostly in maintenance.”¹³ Whether full or part-time, the military commander carries the responsibility for accomplishing the unit’s primary mission. The Air National Guard commander, regardless of status, should remain cognizant of DOD’s intention to use reservists in lesser regional contingencies.¹⁴

For peace operations and MOOTW, the services, particularly the Air Force, have depended upon reservists to meet personnel shortfalls among deployed forces.¹⁵ In the

view of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deborah R. Lee, "...the Reserve components will have a tremendous peacetime role to play in supporting the active forces so long as budgets remain tight and the tempo of day-to-day military operations remains high."¹⁶ This trend shows no sign of abating as depicted in the following illustrations.




Source: ANG Eastern Deployments," *ANG Director's Dashboard*, On-line, National Guard Bureau, Washington D. C., 12 Feb 96.

Figure 1. ANG Eastern Deployments for January 1997



ANG WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS



Source: “ANG Western Deployments,” *ANG Director’s Dashboard*, On-line, National Guard Bureau, Washington D. C., 12 Feb 96.

Figure 2. ANG Western Deployments for January 1997

Military operations other than war or MOOTW is more than just another military acronym; it is an operational reality. Today, the active-duty force is adjusting to the multifarious missions it has inherited since the implosion of the Soviet Union. While, warfighting still exemplifies the ethos of the active duty airman and soldier, many reservists possess much needed expertise honed in the private sector. Many civilian career skills have application in today’s technologically based military. Take information warfare as an example. In private industry, citizen-soldiers design and operate highly advanced computer and communication systems. According to General Ronald R. Fogleman, the transferability of high-tech skills can help the Air Force protect its computer based capabilities while finding ways to attack those of its adversary.¹⁷ “As new doctrine and strategy are written, reservists can contribute real-world expertise and skills to the

process.”¹⁸ Reservists currently employ these attributes in MOOTW settings across the globe. Many do so voluntarily.

Reservists have repeatedly displayed enthusiasm for real-world missions. Ninety percent of the respondents to a 1995 Air Force Survey indicated interest in volunteering for overseas duty like Bosnia or Somalia.¹⁹ As of January 1997, more than 2,000 Air Force reservists have served in the Bosnia area of responsibility (AOR) supporting Operation Joint Endeavor.²⁰ Recent studies describe volunteer reservists as highly qualified and effective.²¹

General Shalikashvili, commenting on the performance of reservists in Central and Eastern Europe reports,

I have heard nothing but laudatory comments about the extraordinary caliber of the American military personnel participating in these programs. I hear the same four virtues used in every description of their performance: professionalism, high technical competence, complete dedication and a true faith in democracy.²²

To date, a sufficient pool of volunteers exists. However, past success “...is not necessarily predictive of the future.”²³ This Government Accounting Office forecast deeply concerns the Air Force since it depends on reserve component volunteers to meet day-to-day requirements. Although a form of activation, volunteers may lack the critical Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) needed. In addition, planners cannot project the rate of volunteers over the course of a long-term operation.²⁴ To support peacekeeping operations by the other services, DOD has made use of the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority.

The 1995 Defense Authorization Act gave DOD greater access to the Guard and Reserve by extending the period of presidential call-up from 90 to 270 days.²⁵ The

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up, US Title 10 Chapter 1209 Section 12304, allows the President to activate up to 200,000 reservists involuntarily for not more than 270 days without declaring a national emergency.²⁶ The President may invoke this authority to augment active forces for an operational mission. Under US Title 10 Chapter 1209 Section 12301 (d), DOD can activate any reservist with the consent of the individual and the governor if a National Guard member.²⁷ “The demonstrated willingness of DOD to seek and the President to approve call-up authority has minimized the need to rely solely on volunteers to respond to peace operations.”²⁸

Presently, several factors influence the availability of volunteer reservists. Foremost is advance notice before the start of the mission. A DOD task force on quality of life issues recommended improved planning and a minimum advance notice of six months to a year.²⁹ The more notice available, the greater the chance of recruiting volunteers. Tour length is another factor.

Second, AFRES and ANG members indicate a strong willingness to volunteer for deployments of 30 days or less.³⁰ A 1995 AFRES survey showed that the percentage of respondents willing to participate in overseas missions dropped as the length of tour increased.³¹ The deployment’s duration often influences the availability to serve because volunteers must make special arrangements with their employers.³² Experience shows it is much easier to fill openings with individuals rather than entire units.

A third factor is whether the deployment requires individuals or units. The size of the unit needed also matters. “Large units are more difficult to obtain on a voluntary basis than individuals or small units because each unit member must consent to volunteer for a mission. This has not been a major problem in the Air Force or Navy, which tend to

deploy volunteers as individuals or as part of small units.”³³ So far, the air reserve components have absorbed their increased optempo without degrading readiness. An ample supply of volunteers insures no one organization shoulders the burden for providing personnel. What does concern senior AFRES and ANG leadership is the impact of increased member participation on employer attitudes and relations. Chapter 3 addresses this issue.

During the 1990’s, the Air Reserve Components became senior partners with the active force for guaranteeing the nation’s security. The AFRES or ANG no longer practice to thwart Soviet aggression. Yet, The U. S. military is as busy now as during the period of superpower confrontation. Today, the active-duty cannot even conduct a medium-sized Joint Task Force without the use of reserve components.³⁴ And, the Air Force Reserve’s and Air National Guard’s share of Air Force missions and weapon systems continues to grow. Only with major contributions from the reserve components, have the active forces accomplished an expanded and diverse array of missions in the Post-Cold War world.

Notes

¹ Deborah R. Lee, “Employer’s Support Vital to Reserve Contingency Operations,” *Defense Issues*, Vol. 11, 2.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

³ Suzann Chapman, “Total Force Never Stops,” *Air Force Magazine*, November 1996, 35.

⁴ Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Reserve Vital to Total Force Team,” *The Officer*, May 1996, 12.

⁵ Suzann Chapman, “Total Force Never Stops,” *Air Force Magazine*, November 1996, 34.

⁶ Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Fundamental to Military Tradition: American Militia Nation,” *Defense Issues* 10, no. 92, 5.

⁷ Suzann Chapman, “Total Force Never Stops,” *Air Force Magazine*, November 1996, 35.

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Chapter 3

The Citizen-Soldier And The New Militia Tradition

In 2050, the first launch will take place for a mission to Mars and a Guardsman will be in the cockpit, because the citizen-soldier will be even more important in 2050 than they are now.

—Major General Donald W. Sheppard, May 1996

America's return to the Militia Tradition requires a vision of the future for making critical decisions about the composition of the Total Force; the systems needed for training and fighting; and, the adoption of new technologies to give the U. S. an unparalleled military superiority. This chapter will review several trends to assess their effect on the use of air reserve forces in the future operations. Whether the part-time commander is ultimately proactive or reactive could depend upon his/her understanding of events unfolding now. In FY 97, the Bottom-Up Review directed downsizing of the armed forces is roughly 80% complete.¹ The next few years should afford some stability for continued integration of active duty and reserve forces.

The military will continue striving for seamless integration as mandated by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.² Seamless integration is the product of strong, recurring cooperation between active and reserve forces. The Air National Guard is already moving in this direction with its staff integration plan. By the end of FY 98, the Air National Guard will have assigned about 100 of its officers to two

unified commanders, the major commands of the Air Force and the Joint Staff.³ Conversely, active duty officers will occupy positions within the Air National Guard.

On 31 July 1997, Colonel (S) Walt Burns will assume command of the 103d Fighter Wing, Connecticut Air National Guard. The 103d will become the first Air Guard unit commanded by an officer drawn from the active duty Air Force.⁴ Burns will serve a three year tour as wing commander. MG David W. Gray, adjutant general of Connecticut believes an active duty officer in this position will "...serve to enhance the mutual connectivity between the Air Force and the Air National Guard within the framework of the Total Force concept."⁵ A closer association between active-duty and reserve components is essential to fully execute the National Military Strategy in the Post-Cold War period.

The reserve components will play a larger part in traditional peacekeeping operations under the National Military Strategy. Since 1989, DOD has conducted approximately 50 separate operations.⁶ During a typical week, 30,000 to 80,000 active personnel deploy from home station in support of six to seven operations.⁷ Projections reveal no downward trend anytime soon. "Reserve component elements will take on increased responsibility for peacekeeping in and supporting peacekeeping missions."⁸ On the other hand, the reserves still retain their function of directly supporting the active forces during a major regional contingency.

The current Chairman of the House National Security Committee, Congressman Floyd D. Spence, believes today's reserves have two primary functions in tomorrow's national security environment. First, they will remain integral to the nation's security in peace and war. Secondly, reservists will function as a repository of trained talent able to

mobilize on short notice.⁹ The Air Force would need to activate hundreds of thousands of Guard and Reserve personnel for two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.¹⁰ Whichever mission the reserve forces perform under the National Military Strategy in the 21st century, they must be ready when the klaxon sounds. Recent call-ups demonstrate this need for readiness.

Operation Joint Endeavor has involved, to date, almost 10,000 reservists recalled to active duty under PSRC with two-thirds being Army Reserve.¹¹ The President's call-up action is one of two options available for mobilizing reservists in peacetime. The other is voluntary activation. There is a growing acceptance to use involuntary call-up authority for even minor military operations. General John Shalikashvili believes the National Guard and Reserve should link with the overseas commands they will support during crisis or war. "There is no better way to build the needed familiarity than by continually rotating National Guard units and Reservists through these theaters."¹² What is rapidly becoming a fact of life, at one time, was politically unthinkable.¹³

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority empowers the President to order reservists involuntarily to active duty for up to 270 days. The other method is activation with the consent of the individual under 10 U.S.C. 12301 (d). The Department of Defense has sought Presidential call-up authority rather than depend strictly on volunteers to support peace operations.¹⁴ The operation plans (OPLANS) of the geographical CINCs assume an involuntary call-up of reservists for contingencies. The 1994 employment of U. S. troops to Haiti and Kuwait validated this supposition when the use of the PSRC encountered no obstacles.¹⁵ In Haiti, nearly 5,000 Guard and Reserve provided medical services, military police, tactical airlift and other key functions.¹⁶ The actual number of

reservists recalled under PSRC was 1,131.¹⁷ Past events, as shown in the table below, imply a more liberal use of PSRC for future contingencies; however, the Air Force still prefers volunteers.

Table 2. Reserve Component Participation in Post-Cold War Military Operations

OPERATION	RESERVE USED	METHOD
1983 Urgent Fury - Grenada	Yes	Voluntary
1986 Libya	Yes	Voluntary
1987 Persian Gulf	Yes	Voluntary
1989 Just Cause - Panama	Yes	Voluntary
1990 Desert Shield/Storm	Yes	Voluntary
1992 Provide Hope - Somalia	Yes	Voluntary
1993 Bosnia	Yes ^a	Involuntary
1994 Uphold Democracy - Haiti	Yes	Involuntary
1994 Vigilant Warrior - Kuwait	Yes ^a	Involuntary

Source: John C. F. Tillson et al., *Reserve Component Roles, Mix and Employment* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1995), ES-7.

^a Plans for these operations included Reserve Component forces

The Department of Defense's use of reservists in daily military operations means commanders could have unit members recalled involuntarily to active-duty for an extended period of time. Again, the Air Force favors using volunteers under all circumstances even for major regional conflicts. In the event of protracted hostilities marked by highly intense operations, the Air Force would use involuntary call-ups to obtain complete units.¹⁸ Moreover, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard commanders themselves will likely work in a joint environment. *Joint Vision 2010* addresses these types of operations.

Joint Vision 2010 is the blueprint for warfighting in the 21st Century. *Joint Vision 2010* seeks to achieve "...a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future."¹⁹ In future operations and exercises, AFRES and ANG

personnel will train with other services as well as the militaries of allied nations.²⁰ According to the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, the reserve components "...must not only understanding *JV 2010* but must become engaged in the implementation process."²¹ Joint operations will foster new levels of articulation between the CINCs and services and the reserve components. To remain relevant in future missions and war planning, the reserves must become more active in the joint arena.²² General Shalikashvili has directed the CINCs to integrate the reserve components into their "supporting visions" of future operations.²³ The capabilities based in the AFRES and ANG can help these organizations transition to the new roles and missions emanating from *Joint Vision 2010*.

Finally, the application of civilian-acquired knowledge and skills for military purposes benefits the active force. A fundamental strength of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard lies in the diversity of their members. Since the majority have civilian careers, these citizen-soldiers manifest a plethora of educational levels, vocational experiences and training both formal and informal. During the Gulf War, the armed services needed reservists for their skills especially in combat support and combat service support functions. "Many reservists had civilian skills that related directly to their military assignments."²⁴ In the future, reservists, with backgrounds steeped in advanced civilian-based systems, will perform many of the military's complex missions. General Ronald R. Fogleman describes information operations, space operations and unmanned vehicles as areas ideally suited for the air reserve components.²⁵ Currently, the Air National Guard is accepting important roles in the space support mission.²⁶ This reliance illustrates how the

Air National Guard is transforming itself from predominately a fighter force to one balanced across all mission areas.²⁷

Several trends will likely impact the Air Reserve Components in the future. Heading the list is an upward swing in deployments requiring a significant reserve presence. To insure the right mix of specialties for these operations, a greater number of activations under Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority will occur. Involuntary recalls may be short notice and for lengthy periods of time. Consequently, personnel readiness will subsume a new sense of urgency. Lessons learned from recent deployments reveal that Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel will function in a joint environment and in concert with the armed services of allied countries. Finally, the proficiency reservists hone in their civilian careers will prove vital to the Air Force of the 21st in areas such as computer, information and space related technologies.

Notes

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Chapter 4

The Traditional Commander—Issues And Challenges

Commanders underestimate the threat they are.

—Proverbs for Command

A momentum caused by changes in defense policy and the international geopolitical situation is steering the Air Reserve Components in a new direction. Reservists retain certain specialties not readily found in the active force. Perhaps most affected by the expansion of the Air Reserve Components' roles and mission is the traditional unit commander. The focus of this chapter is how the part-time soldier addresses these new challenges.

Traditional commanders, themselves citizen-soldiers, have to balance civilian careers and family commitments with the dictates of military service. Effective command is rarely the product of one weekend drill a month and 15 days of annual training. Rather, significant participation is usually the norm. It is common to regularly call and visit one's unit several times a month just to transact routine business that transpires between unit training assemblies (UTAs). Although part-time commanders delegate assignments to subordinates, some areas remain exclusively in his or her domain like boards and sensitive personnel actions. Only the commander can perform certain duties. Therefore, the more

responsibilities a unit incurs for deployments, exercises and training, the greater the leadership challenge for the unit commander, active-duty and reserve.

The increased optempo of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard during the past several years will, predictably, upset any equilibrium established among a traditional commander's civilian career, family and military obligations. "In contrast to active forces, the conflict between family roles and military duty increases rather than diminishes as a reservist moves up the military career ladder."¹ Satisfaction as well as sacrifice is inherent in the service of one's country. The families and employers of reservists also make sacrifices; however, they do not share the same level of satisfaction enjoyed by the reservist.² A repetitive cycle of leaving the civilian workplace for military duty and returning weeks or months later could, ultimately, affect promotion or retention. Few non-defense civilian industries and privately operated businesses can afford to allow employees to leave their jobs repeatedly to augment the active forces in peacekeeping or minor operations.³ Frequent absence may also strain relations with fellow workers. Maintaining good civilian employer relations in a period of high military optempo is a program worthy of command emphasis at the unit level.

In October 1994, Congress passed the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). USERRA provides job protection to reservists when they perform military training. It is unlawful for any employer to terminate a worker because of military commitments or to discriminate against the service member "...with regard to hiring, promotion, reemployment, termination or benefits."⁴ USERRA prevents employers from taking action against an employee who seeks reemployment protection under the law.

USERRA allows reservists to retain their civilian positions at the same pay and seniority status that they would have earned if they had remained on the job. “If they missed a promotion, they must be trained and promoted.”⁵ Such protection only applies to permanent employment, not temporary. The definition of temporary employment is “...a brief, nonrecurrent period and there was no reasonable expectation that it would continue indefinitely.”⁶ Conversely, the reservist must provide the employer with advanced written or verbal notice for any type of military duty unless military necessity makes it impossible or unreasonable. The cumulative length of a person’s uniformed service cannot exceed five years. Also under USERRA, the reservist must receive an honorable discharge and give the employer advance notice of his/her return. A 1996 Government Accounting Office study states employers still prefer that reservists “...be involuntarily ordered to duty because of concern that reservists could abuse their reemployment rights.”⁷ To prevent increased optempo demands from conflicting with civilian employment and negatively affecting retention, promotion and support of employer support activities must occur at every tier of command.

During Desert Shield/Storm, communities and employers generally supported those reservists involuntarily ordered to active duty. Employers expressed a different viewpoint when their employees volunteered.⁸ Unit programs that kept employers informed about their employees on active duty proved immensely successful in planning for the reservist’s return.⁹ Today’s deployments do not match the magnitude of Desert Shield/Storm; however, many of the lessons learned from this war still apply. Studies from the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve show that one-third of the respondents identified “employer conflict” as a reason for leaving the Reserve and

Guard.¹⁰ Aggressive, resourceful employer and community support programs can minimize potential problems and eliminate misunderstandings concerning military duty.¹¹ While national initiatives exist for employer support, unit programs can be very effective at the grassroots level.

A recent questionnaire completed by 686 nationwide employers uncovered a need for information about reserve missions and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.¹² Serving as an example to subordinates, traditional commanders should involve their own employers in unit and National Employer Support award and recognition programs. Encouraging unit members to submit the names for the *My Boss Is A Patriot* award offers a perfect opportunity to invite these key people to the base for an award presentation and tour. Doing so helps build a bridge to the community and private sector. Reserve commanders can make the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) recognition program part of their reenlistment and retention interviews so everyone learns the value of good employer relations.

Each year, the traditional commander may wish to hold a high-profile NCESGR program such as a “Boss Lift” or “Breakfast with the Boss.” These forums can feature different formats—overview of USERRA, mission briefings or a roundtable discussion about employer concerns. The traditional commander has a personal and professional stake in soliciting the cooperation of the community and employers particularly during peacetime. During activations, exercises or operations where a clear crisis is lacking, employers and families may be ambivalent or opposed to the reservist’s prolonged absence from home.¹³ A concerted effort to keep families and employers informed about the unit’s

mission and upcoming deployments and exercises may avoid some of the frustrations experienced previously. Another lesson gleaned from the Gulf War pertains to unit cohesion.

During Desert Shield/Storm, the best prepared Air National Guard units shared common qualities—high readiness standards, high marks on evaluations, exercises and inspections and strong leadership.¹⁴ Air National Guard commanders believed their units would fight as they had trained, i.e., like units. This was not the case. Air National Guard volunteers performed many essential missions when the U. S. responded militarily to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 7 August 1990 until the activation of reservists on 22 August 1990.¹⁵ Air National Guard commanders quickly discovered how volunteerism among their members could adversely impact unit readiness and morale.

Unit commanders had to determine how the departure of experienced personnel or even whole sections would affect unit readiness. Voids soon appeared within organizations with the loss of specific specialties such as security police or services people. The loss of key individuals and sections degraded unit capability and cohesion. "Time and a sense of purpose and accomplishment created a bond and close-knit, well-trained, and well-coordinated functions."¹⁶ Activating volunteers and recalling others threatened the homeostasis many units had built.

The activation of individuals and not units upset many ANG members.¹⁷ Those who did not volunteer sometimes felt pressured to do so. Conversely, volunteers who served on active duty often felt a sense of increased self-importance when they returned.¹⁸ Unit commanders did try to recognize the meritorious achievements of those who stayed behind and supported the mobilization and war efforts. Finally, Air National Guard

commanders who had trained to deploy with their units often remained at home station themselves. In many cases, they made the tough personnel decisions about who would stay and who would go. In future call-ups, except for medical or security police, full unit activation is no longer part of ANG contingency planning.¹⁹

The traditional unit commander could face tomorrow's challenges with many of the same frustrations and emotions his or her predecessors wrestled with during Desert Shield/Storm. Because of the degree of reserve presence in current military operations, part-time commanders should heed the lessons learned about volunteerism as well as ways to bring closure when members return home to the unit. After the Gulf War, de-mobilized reservists found that homecomings eased the transition back to civilian life. A need existed to affirm their sacrifice and dedication to duty.²⁰ Yet, tensions over positions, promotions or status could very well erupt between those who regularly participate in deployments and those who do not. Concern also exists over the use of reserve forces to fill force structure shortages in the active force. Reliance on reserve volunteers to act as replacements for the understrength active-duty forces affects the readiness and deployability of reserve units.²¹ Reservists generally train together for years. The resulting cohesion among units often compensates for reduced training opportunities. For this reason, maintenance of reserve unit integrity is important.²²

Finally, the advent of new technologies has spawned novel techniques for managing information, teaching higher order skills and fighting wars. "If we expect this nation to thrive well into the 21st century, military leaders must prepare for a world changing rapidly in technology, in pace and in overall dimension."²³ "If you do not know the difference between the Information Superhighway, the World Wide Web and the

Internet...you are about to lose your job.”²⁴ These statements by Major General Sheppard, Director of the Air National Guard, epitomize the organizational transformations taking place under CyberGuard.

CyberGuard is the information system the Air National Guard is creating to meet the challenges of the next millennium. Although technologically based, an innovative architecture symbolizes CyberGuard. According to Major General Sheppard, “CyberGuard is about the way we live, work, train and fight in the world of the 21st Century.”²⁵ Emphasis is on real-time communication, decision making and training. CyberGuard requires new processes; therefore, institutional behaviors, skills and values will differ markedly from today’s organizational structure. Through advanced fiber-optics and telecommunication systems, ANG members will use the Internet, World Wide Web, Local Area Network, Video Teleconferencing, and the Warrior Network as tools to accomplish daily tasks. For instance, the Warrior Network, a satellite-based system, links Air National Guard bases across the country instantaneously. In addition, the concept of functional teams is replacing traditional hierarchical structures. What is the implication of CyberGuard for the part-time commander? Computer literacy is a prerequisite to function in this system.

The digital revolution sparked by the microprocessor is transforming the way the world does business. CyberGuard is an outgrowth of this revolution. Routine activities and training now conducted at the unit will be accomplished on-line at home. A higher proportion of the part-time commander’s duties will occur extraneously to the military base. Thus, the unit can concentrate on mission related activities when it assembles for

drills. In working from new paradigms, CyberGuard will offer a distinctive challenge to the part-time commander.

If a basic tenet of command is leadership by example, then ANG commanders may find themselves riding The Third Wave of change inundating American society.²⁶ Unique and complex problems will demand innovative solutions. Entrenchment in the comfortable and familiar will become a liability to the dynamic and visionary organization forged by CyberGuard. Do not look for a compendium of tried and true answers. CyberGuard will entail out-of-the-box thinking and a synergy of systems characterized by adaptability and a free-flow of ideas and information. An exponential increase of information means members of the Air National Guard will have to pursue programs for personal development to remain relevant in a changing world.

Notes

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¹⁹ Ibid., 125.

²⁰ Ibid., 127.

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Chapter 5

Conclusions

Leadership is not rank, privileges, titles or money. It is responsibility.

—Peter F. Drucker, October 1995

The previous chapters examined the evolution of The Total Force; the changing mission and role of the reserve components; the current trends impacting the reserve force; and, several poignant issues and challenges the part-time commander faces today. As the responsibilities of command increase proportionately with the missions the reserve force is undertaking, the best single resource available to the traditional commander is his or her own quality of leadership.

Service before self is one of three core values of the Air Force and involves courage.¹ Earlier discussions alluded to the breadth and rapidity of change military commanders will confront. Before accepting the mantle of command, the citizen-soldier should weigh the requirements of the position versus personal motivations. Part-time commanders must have the courage to look deep inside themselves and ask, “Can I give the time it takes to accomplish what is expected of me?” Inevitably, Air National Guard commanders will assume more responsibility as The Total Force concept continues to evolve.

With the pace of change reaching hyperspeed proportions, traditional commanders may discover that they cannot devote the kind of attention it takes to run a unit without

sacrificing their civilian careers and families. Competence is not the problem. Time is! As cited in Chapters 3 and 4, ANG commanders face unique issues arising from worldwide deployments.

During the Cold War, the military focused on a single mission: deter and defeat communism. Today's world is filled with niche' competitors, regional flash points and MOOTW situations. A new American military strategy finds reservists in nearly every region of the world performing a variety of missions.

In 1995, former Secretary of Defense Perry wanted the reserve components included in more peacekeeping operations as well as programs to democratize the militaries of countries emerging from autocratic rule.² Today, Perry's vision is reality. At the height of the Cold War, the reserves comprised about 35% of the Total Force.³ By early in the 21st century, the Air Force ratio of active to reserve may stand at 50-50.⁴ To balance the Federal budget by 2002, a cut of 12% in defense spending is necessary.⁵ "The way to do that is put more reliance on the citizen-soldier..."⁶ When the Air Force finishes downsizing, it will have reduced 40 fighter wings to 20 with seven contained in the Guard and Reserve.⁷ A single major regional conflict requires ten fighter wings, 80 heavy bombers and 90% of U. S. airlift.⁸ Such trends all point toward increased optempo for the Guard and Reserve. In the event fighting erupts in a CINC's AOR, then the Air National Guard will contribute forces from the outset of hostilities. Other than the U. S., only Israel rapidly employs its reserves and holds them to high training standards.⁹ The likelihood of deployments involving reservists increases as The Total Force becomes more seamless.¹⁰ No longer a force of last resort, the purpose of the Guard and Reserve has changed. To quote Major General Sheppard, "Instead of 'Weekend Warriors' around for the big one;

we are now quasi full-time soldiers. It is a total change in our life and that is what the new world demands.”¹¹

Can the traditional ANG unit commander measure up to what the new world demands? The answer will depend on the situation and the factors involved. This is not a trivial question since the traditional Guardperson occupies almost one-half of command billets as shown in the following table.

Table 3. Profile of Air National Guard Unit Commanders

UNIT LEVEL	TRADITIONAL	FULL-TIME	TOTAL	PERCENT TRADITIONAL	PERCENT FULL-TIME
FLIGHT	280	209	489	53.7	42.7
SQUADRON	439	310	749	58.6	41.4
GROUP	58	222	280	20.7	79.3
WING	40	131	171	23.4	76.6
TOTAL	817	872	1689	48.4	51.6

Source: Al Goldsticker, Customer Service, Air National Guard Support Center, Andrews AFB, MD, telephone interview with author, 25 March 1997.

During the selection process used for choosing commanders, a candidate’s ability to balance career, family and unit requirements should get careful consideration.

The normal selection of Air National Guard unit commanders occurs at the unit or state level. Article I, Section 7 of the United States Constitution reserves for the states “...the Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”¹² The authority to appoint officers in the state militias rests with the states’ governors. Consequently, the National Guard Bureau does not promulgate a criterion for choosing unit commanders. Rather, responsibility to make the

right decision rests with senior Guard officers. It is the author's hope that "the potential to contribute" is a quality universally sought in candidates for command.

Command is a serious and trusted privilege. The tenor of the times will not tolerate detachment or ineptitude for long. Furthermore, the perils of overseas operations do not permit a compromise in readiness. The stakes are just too high! The traditional commander has a moral obligation to give what the job demands. The moniker of "part-timer" is a misnomer in light of the sophisticated assignments being levied on today's Guard and Reserve.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, wonders "...If we are overstressing and overworking our Reservists and National Guardsmen by asking you to perform so many vitally important tasks."¹³ Maj. Gen. Robert A. McIntosh, Chief of Air Force Reserve, states, "OPTEMPO is expected to remain high, and we expect to be asked to shoulder more of the burden."¹⁴ Steven M. Duncan warns, "The Total Force Policy of the future should not attempt to make active, career soldiers and reserve soldiers fungible items or mirror images of each other."¹⁵ The trends discussed previously show a growing inclusion of reserve forces in the execution of the National Military Strategy. To date, volunteerism in the Air Reserve Components has offset the stresses of optempo; but, for how long? The senior Air National Guard leadership monitors the number of exercises and deployments. Yet, it is the duty of the unit commanders to raise the warning flag when optempo becomes too onerous. Pride in performance should not prevent ANG commanders from recognizing a unit's limit of endurance. Success today brings more missions tomorrow.

The current revolution in military affairs raises the ante on what others will expect from military commanders, active-duty and reserve. A professional development program can help the traditional commander maintain familiarity with on-going issues and trends. Awareness of change occurring in the profession of arms is critical to staying afloat in a sea awash with information. Whereas professional military education teaches the operational art of warfare, a personal development program inculcates the individual with a broad, cross-disciplinary perspective. Reading and thinking about information management, leadership, military history, and organizational theory permit introspection to occur against a backdrop of contemporary thought.

Attitudes and talents in vogue today rapidly become the “wrong” ones tomorrow. “Continued learning is crucial to continued success.”¹⁶ Continued learning is also the source of new leadership behaviors for changing times. Concomitantly, military leaders must unlearn the old styles of command that become obtuse and ineffective. Exposure to a myriad of ideas, theories and treatise gives leaders a sense of direction; they become forward looking. Such is the rationale behind General Ronald R. Fogleman’s professional reading program initiated 1 March 1997.¹⁷ The program’s goal is to stimulate thinking and promote the professional growth of Air Force officers. Appendix C contains the Chief of Staff’s suggested readings on the Basic, Intermediate and Advanced Lists.

A self-improvement program allows part-time commanders to anticipate developments and remain professionally astute as the Total Force continues to evolve. Since the traditional commander lacks the day-to-day continuity of active-duty peers, he or she should make a special effort to stay abreast of military issues. This includes involvement in professional associations, subscription to military publications, attendance

at conferences and conventions, and enrollment in resident courses at the I. G. Brown Professional Center or Air University. Much of this will be an out-of-pocket expense; however, that is the cost of doing business. The benefits derived from a program of life-long learning will allow the traditional commander to shape a Militia Tradition for the 21st century.

Notes

¹ Shelia E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, "Core Values of the Air Force," Address to U. S. Air Force Academy Cadets, Colorado Springs, CO, 18 April 1996, 3.

² William J. Perry, "More Realism, Readiness, Operations for Guard and Reserve," *Defense Issues* 10, no. 15: 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴ MGen Donald W. Sheppard, "The Air Guard Perspective," Address to the Air Force Association Mid-American Symposium, St. Louis, MO., 3 May 1996, 18.

⁵ "General Sheppard Maps Out A Flight Plan for the Nation's Air National Guard Leadership," *National Guard* 50, no. 11(November 1996): 23.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, "Fundamental to Military Tradition: American Militia Nation," *Defense Issues* 10, no. 92, 5.

⁸ John T. Cornell, "The High-Risk Military Strategy," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1994, 38.

⁹ John C. F. Tillson et al., *Reserve Component Roles, Mix and Employment* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1995), ES-9.

¹⁰ Cong. Floyd D. Spence, "Reserves Play Major Role in Military Strategy," *The Officer*, February 1997, 18.

¹¹ ¹¹ MGen Donald W. Sheppard, "The Air Guard Perspective," Address to the Air Force Association Mid-American Symposium, St. Louis, MO., 3 May 1996, 17.

¹² *The Constitution of the United States*, (Washington D. C.: Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 1989), 7.

¹³ Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, "Building Foundation of America's Forces for 21st Century," *The Officer*, February 1997, 36.

¹⁴ MGen Robert A. McIntosh, "Ready to Meet Challenges," *The Officer*, February 1997, 59.

¹⁵ Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 227.

¹⁶ James A. Belasco and Ralph C. Stayer, *Flights of the Buffalo* (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1993), 8.

¹⁷ Julie Bird, "Hit the Books," *Air Force Times*, 10 February 1997.

Appendix A

Air National Guard Force Composition

PERSONNEL

OFFICERS—13,521
ENLISTED—96,305
CIVILIANS—1,630
TOTAL—111,456

AIRCRAFT

Aircraft—The Air National Guard possesses over 1200 aircraft with a fleet comprising:

C5A Transports
C-141B Transports
KC-135 Tankers
A/OA-10A Attack Aircraft
A/OA-10A Observation Aircraft
B-1 Bomber
C-130 Transport
HC-130/HH-60G Rescue Aircraft
EC-130E Special Operations Aircraft
F-15 A/B Fighters
F-16 A/B/C/D Fighters
F-15 A/B Fighters—Air Defense
F-16 A/B Fighters—Air Defense

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FORCE ROLES AND MISSIONS

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Fighter Interceptor Forces/1st AF	100%
Aircraft Control & Warning	100%
Mobile Ground Station for Space Mission	100%
Combat Communications (Excluding JCSS Units)	68%

Tactical Airlift	43.9%
KC-135 Air Refueling	33%
General Purpose Fighters	32.6%
Rescue	27.5%
Aeromedical Evacuation	25%
Tactical Air Support	22.6%

AIR NATIONAL GUARD (Cont.)

B-1 Bombers	9%
Strategic Airlift Capability	8.3%
Engineering Installation	74%
Aerial Port	21%
RED HORSE	45%
Civil Engineering	49%
USAF Bands	49%
Medical	15%
Weather	46%
Airlift Control	32%
Security Police	26%
Intelligence	3%

AIR FORCE RESERVE

Aerial Port Capability	59%
A/OA-10	20%
B-52H Bombers	6%
C-5, C-141 Airlift	24%
C-5, C-141 Airlift Aircrews (Shared Aircraft)	57%
C-9 Aeromedical Airlift Aircrews (Shared Aircraft)	27%
C-17 (Shared Aircraft)	23%
C-130 Airlift	23%
F-16 Fighters	5%
Fixed-Wing Aerial Spraying Capability	100%
HC-130, HH-60 Rescue	38%
KC-135	14%
KC-135 Aircrews (Shared Aircraft)	7%
KC-10 Aircrews (Shared Aircraft)	41%
Medical Flight Crew Capability	92%
Space Operations	10%
WC-130 Weather Reconnaissance	100%

Sources: "Air National Guard." *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 5 (May 1996): 105-107.


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Appendix B

SHIFT IN FORCE MIX

Percent of Total Force in the Guard and Reserve



Source: Tirpak, John A. "The Evolution of the Total Force." *Air Force Magazine* 7 no. 7 (July 1996): 20-25.

Percentage of Air Force missions performed by the Air Reserve Components

Appendix C

Air Force Chief Of Staff's Suggested Reading List

Basic List

10 Propositions Regarding Airpower by Phillip Meilinger

The Art of War by Sun-Tzu

A few Great Captains: The Men and Events that Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power
by Dewitt Copp

Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq by Richard Reynolds

Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the American Air Service in World War I by James Hudson

Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for Tough Times by Donald Phillips

Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War
by John Darrell Sherwood

The Right Stuff by Tom Wolfe

A Short History of Air Power by James Stokesbury

This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History by T.R. Fehrenbach

Thud Ridge by Jack Broughton

We Were Soldiers Once...and Young: Ia Drang, the Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam
by Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway

Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II by Geoffrey Perret

Intermediate List

Airpower: A Centennial Appraisal by Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason

Deke!: U.S. Manned Space—From Mercury to the Shuttle by Donald “Deke” Slayton with Michael Cassutt

The First Air War, 1914-1918 by Lee Kennett

General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War by George Kenney

The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam by Mark Clodfelter

Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age edited by Peter Paret

Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II by Thomas Alexander Hughes

Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War by Richard Hallion

The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 by Robert Frank Futrell

Advanced List

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat by John Warden

Flight of the Buffalo: Soaring to Excellence, Learning to Let Employees Lead by James Belasco and Ralph Stayer

The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf by Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor

The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age by Walter McDougall

Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General by Phillip Meilinger

Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I by I.B. Holley Jr.

Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991 by James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson

Joint Military Operations: A Short History by Roger Beaumont

On War by Carl Von Clausewitz

The Sky on Fire: The First Battle of Britain, 1917-1918, and the Birth of the Royal Air Force by Raymond Fredette

Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect by U.S. Grant Sharp

Why the Allies Won by Richard Overy

Glossary

AD	Active Duty
AF	Air Force
AFRES	Air Force Reserve
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AG	Adjutant General
AGR	Air Guard Reserve
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARF	Air Reserve Force
AT	Annual Training
BUR	Bottom-Up Review
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions
DOD	Department of Defense
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accounting Office
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IRT	Innovative Readiness Training
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NCESGR	National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OPTEMPO	Operations Tempo
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense

USERRA
UTA

Uniformed Services Employer and Reemployment Act
Unit Training Assembly

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